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Abstract 
 
People asked to recall the memory of an event during testimony are encouraged to 
prioritize both quantity and quality – "the whole truth and nothing but the truth".  
Extensive research has shown that people can provide detailed, confident accounts that 
nevertheless prove to be inaccurate (Loftus, 1996). However, the question remains of 
how pressuring people to give confident and elaborate accounts of their memories 
subsequently changes these accounts. We conducted an experiment in which 51 
participants provided accounts of autobiographical events and film plots (control 
condition), and later re-told these accounts under the instruction to retrieve more 
information. We measured the effects of task demands on the quantity (number of words 
and number of facts) and quality (confidence ratings) of information retrieved, as well as 
on the affective and cognitive language used during each account. Task demands at re-
telling led to participants providing a greater amount of information, with their likelihood 
of doing so and their confidence in these newly communicated memory details linked to 
rumination tendencies and mood. These findings give insights into the cognitive 
processing of autobiographical memories, and provide a better understanding of the 
factors affecting eyewitness testimony.  
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1. Introduction  
Extensive research on the mechanisms of memory has resulted in increasing 
efforts to better communicate research findings to the general public (Lacy & Starck, 
2013). Nevertheless, erroneous beliefs about human memory abilities endure (Loftus, 
1979; Simons & Chabris, 2011). The tight link between memory and selfhood makes any 
autobiographical account a subjective one; thus, separating facts from distorted details in 
one’s autobiographical account is a constant challenge (Conway, 2005). Beliefs and prior 
expectations, personality, and mood are all factors that influence how a memory is 
retrieved, and how confident the person who remembers it is about the details of the 
event being recalled (Wise et al., 2014). This project investigated the link between 
people’s confidence in their autobiographical memories and their response to being 
instructed to provide rich narrative accounts of happy and sad events that happened to 
them. Participants were first asked to provide accounts of autobiographical events and 
film plots (control condition), and later re-told these accounts under the instruction to 
retrieve more information. We measured the effects of task demands on the quantity 
(number of facts) and quality (confidence ratings) of information retrieved, as well as on 
the language used during each account. The goals of this project were to describe the 
effects of a demand to recount as many details as possible about a memory on the length 
of the accounts provided and on participants’ confidence in the details of these accounts. 
We also addressed the impact of personality characteristics on both variables.  
1.1 Popular beliefs about memory 
The general public tends to be more confident about human memory abilities than 
memory experts, and scientific findings established for decades do not influence public 
	 2	 
belief as much as intuition and common sense do (Simons & Chabris, 2011; Wise et al., 
2011). A study conducted by Simons and Chabris in 2011 showed that 63% of the U.S. 
population believes that memory works like a video camera; 47.6% believes that once a 
memory of an event is formed, that memory does not change; 37.1% believes that the 
testimony of a confident eyewitness should be enough to convict a defendant of a crime; 
and 77.5% believes that people generally notice when something unexpected enters their 
field of view, even when they are paying attention to something else (Simons & Chabris, 
2011). These results have been replicated with British and Indian populations, where 
59.4% of British and 84.4% of Indian respondents agreed that memories of everything 
experienced are stored permanently in the brain (Patihis et al., 2014). Although a higher 
level of education corresponded with more skepticism about memory abilities, a 
surprisingly high percentage of the population remains unaware about established 
findings on the mechanisms of memory (Simons & Chabris, 2011).  
Misconceptions about memory similarly affect those who make crucial legal 
decisions based on their evaluation of others’ accounts about events. Two thirds of US 
law enforcement officers believe that memory works like a video camera (Wise et al., 
2011), and jurors are prone to endorsing erroneous beliefs about memory (Schmechel et 
al., 2006). In addition, it has been shown that once established, beliefs are difficult to 
change and subsequent contradictory information is often ignored or pushed aside (Otero, 
1998; Vosniadou, 2001). As a result, many individuals still maintain misconceptions 
about memory that affect not only their personal belief systems, but also rules and 
regulations set by institutions and policing entities (Simons & Chabris, 2011). In 
environments such as the legal arena, decisions based on erroneous ideas about the nature 
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of memory can have life-changing consequences for witnesses as well as the accused 
(Lacy & Stark, 2013; Simons & Chabris, 2011).  
When people are asked to testify under oath, they agree to provide as many 
accurate details about an event as they are capable of: “the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth”. The ensuing narration, however, maintains the elements of memories recalled 
under any other circumstances, and can therefore be subjected to the deletion and 
insertion of episodic details (Loftus, 1996). This reality stands in contrast with the 
popular belief, as well as the one most often endorsed in the court system, that a 
confident account is an accurate account (Benton et al., 2006). In the current research, we 
wanted to know how pressuring individuals to give elaborate, confident accounts of their 
memories changes these accounts.  
1.2  Research findings: memory as a reconstruction  
Autobiographical memory is, many argue, the building base of selfhood 
(Schacter, 2001). Memories of specific events come together in a unique pattern of 
interweavement that becomes a life story specific to each person (McAdams, 2015). To 
support this concept, decades of research have shown that memory does not provide a 
reliable representation of events as they happened, since factors during both encoding – 
the process by which an event becomes a memory that is stored as information – and 
retrieval – the process by which the memory of an event is brought back to mind and 
reminisced upon – affect the way in which an event is remembered (Tulving, 1983; 
Schacter, 2001; Loftus, 2005; Howe & Knott, 2015).  
In this study, we investigated effects occurring at the retrieval phase – more 
specifically, participants’ reaction to an instruction to provide as much information as 
	 4	 
possible – as we had no way to verify the accuracy of the narratives related by 
participants and thus any effects present at the encoding and consolidation stages. Once 
encoded, a memory is screened against the inventory of memories already stored in long-
term memory storage and adjusted to fit an existing narrative (Zaragoza et al., 2011), as 
well as discussed with others (Marsh, Tversky, & Hutson, 2005; Kensinger et al., 2016). 
This reconstructive process has been demonstrated at the cellular and molecular level, 
where long-term potentiation (LTP) and long-term depression (LTD) orchestrate the 
strengthening and weakening of synapses that allow a memory to be retrieved (Martin & 
Morris, 2002; Redondo & Morris, 2011), or that allow subsequent memories to interfere 
with the original memory (Hardt, Einarsson, & Nader, 2010). Last but not least, retrieval 
is dependent upon the conditions present in the instance of the memory elicitation – 
relationship to the person or persons listening to the account, purpose of communicating 
the information, and emotional state during the instance of sharing (Mirandola & 
Toffalini, 2016; Thorley et al., 2016; Straube, 2012). Memory accuracy upon recall, 
therefore, fluctuates and is ever changing, and the precise details of an event that 
happened to someone cannot be accessed without video or others forms of objective 
recording. In the absence of a form of objective record, one must rely on a person’s report 
to gain insight into an individual’s personal experience of an event. 
To control for the connection between memory and selfhood, we asked 
participants to describe the plots of happy and sad films they watched; films are similar to 
event memories in that they constitute an episode, but are not connected to a sense of 
identity in the same way that emotional autobiographical memories are. While we did 
acknowledge that some people form strong associations between films and self-identity, 
	 5	 
we reasoned that these associations are different from those between autobiographical 
events and a sense of self, since the events unraveling in films are temporarily detached 
from the instance of encoding – unlike autobiographical events, for which the person 
experiencing them is also an active participant. 
1.3 Factors influencing memory retrieval 
1.3.1. Interviewing Techniques 
An extensive body of research by Loftus and her colleagues has shown that 
people are not only likely to insert new details or fail to mention others in their reports of 
events, but that they can be so highly sensitive to suggestions from a researcher as to give 
detailed reports about events that never happened to them. Events that participants were 
able to describe include a hospital visit (Hyman et al, 1995), an instance of getting lost at 
the local mall (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), and flying in a hot air balloon (Porter, Yuille, & 
Lehman, 1999). Although these events are fictional, participants become convinced that 
they actually happened and give rich, confident reports of their false memories of them 
(Loftus & Bernstein, 2005). 
The way in which an interviewer poses a question also influences the response of 
the person interviewed (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). For example, Loftus and Palmer (1974) 
have proven the misinformation effect – a response to being exposed to misleading or 
distracting information after the event happened – by showing that the way in which an 
interviewer phrases a question about a car accident viewed on video determines the speed 
that participants report for the car involved (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Although 
participants viewed the same video of two cars colliding, those who were queried about 
the speed of the cars using the word “smashed” reported significantly higher speeds than 
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those who were queried using the word “hit” (Loftus & Palmer, 1974).  In the aftermath 
of the interview, the interviewer can still exert an influence over participants’ confidence 
in their accounts by providing either positive feedback to increase confidence (Semmler, 
Brewer & Wells, 2004), or negative feedback to decrease confidence (Luus & Wells, 
1994).  
The relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee is another factor, 
since it can determine how open and willing to cooperate the interviewee is (Garbarski, 
Schaeffer, & Dykema, 2016). Since interviewers are often perceived as authority figures, 
those who are interviewed may become biased towards mentioning details they believe 
the interviewer would like to hear (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994), especially if the 
interviewer is well liked (Jourard, 1959; Certner, 1973) and attentive (Pasupathi, 
Stallworth, & Murdoch, 1998). The quality of the information retrieved can also vary 
depending to whom it is relayed: if relayed to a peer, the account contains more 
evaluations and links to other events and concepts, while when relayed to an interviewer, 
it contains more details meant to clarify the specific situation under scrutiny (Hyman, 
1994). In addition, a cross-race bias has been repeatedly shown, with respondents being 
more skeptical to elaboration when the interviewer had a different racial background 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001). In the effort to provide a guideline for obtaining unbiased 
reports, Fowler and Mangione (1990) introduced a series of guidelines. Their guidelines 
are that first, questions should be written before the interview, and the same questions 
should be read to all those interviewed; second, answers that are not on the topic should 
be addressed similarly and in a pre-established manner; third, answers should be recorded 
as they are given; and fourth, the interviewer should stay nonjudgmental at all times 
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during the interview (Fowler & Mangione, 1990). For the purposes of this study, we tried 
to reduce interviewer bias by following Fowler and Mangione’s guidelines, maintaining a 
neutral disposition across interviews, and avoiding deviation from the focus of the 
interview.  
1.3.2. Personality Characteristics 
Personality characteristics could also modulate people’s likelihood to engage in 
disclosure. While previous research has addressed the impact of personality on self-
disclosure, there is limited research on the effects of personality characteristics on the 
quantity and quality of information retrieved specifically, or on the confidence that 
participants have in their accounts. Introverts engage in self-disclosure less than 
extroverts (Mullaney, 1964), finding which was later replicated by Zimbardo (1977), who 
showed that shy students engage less and are reluctant to add new ideas to a discussion 
(Zimbardo, 1977).  
Emotional stability and neuroticism have also been shown to correlate with 
disclosure, but sex differences exist. Pedersen and Breglio (1968) found a negative 
correlation between self-disclosure and emotional stability in males, but not in females 
(Pedersen & Breglio, 1968). Men are also less likely to participate in disclosure the 
higher they score on a “toughness” scale (Bruch, 2002). Since many of the personality 
characteristics in these studies are captured by the concise Ten-Item Personality 
Inventory, or TIPI (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003, Appendix B), we chose to use 
this scale to capture any effects of the Big-Five personality dimensions on disclosure. 
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1.3.3. Perfectionism  
The relationship between perfectionism, disclosure, and performance under 
pressure is complex, mainly because perfectionism can manifest itself in two distinct 
ways (Rice & Ashby, 2007). On one hand, perfectionists have high standards and 
performance expectations, which translate into increased efforts to accomplish tasks and 
goals (Rice, Ashby, & Slaney, 2007). On the other hand, perfectionism can manifest itself 
in a dysfunctional way by increasing negative emotions associated with fear of failure or 
meeting expectations (Rice & Ashby, 2007). In 2015, Richardson and Rice used the APS-
R (Appendix C), a scale that captures both of these dimensions, to show that those who 
score high in self-critical perfectionism are less likely to engage in disclosure 
(Richardson & Rice, 2015). In the current study, we used the APS-R to describe the 
relationship between perfectionism and the quantity and quality of information disclosed 
under pressure.  
1.3.4. Rumination 
Rumination, a style of thinking in which negative feelings and problems are 
continuously brought to mind, has been often associated with depression (Sansone & 
Sansone, 2012) and affects the way in which depressed individuals report their 
autobiographical memories (Williams, 1996). In a study by Sutherland and Bryant 
(2007), ruminators gave more vague reports about their memories when they were highly 
depressed, but not when they were lowly depressed (Sutherland & Bryant, 2007). Since 
the present study did not specifically recruit dysphoric participants, we were interested in 
whether rumination may affect disclosure of both positive and negative events, and 
whether the instruction to increase the amount of detail mentioned would have a stronger 
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or a weaker effect on those who are prone to rehearsing negative events. Furthermore, 
since rumination has been linked to fear of commitment and fear paralysis (Ward et al., 
2003), as well as poor problem solving (Lyubomirsky et al, 1999), we wanted to 
specifically investigate the effects of rumination on confidence in autobiographical 
memories. 
1.3.5. Behavioral Approach and Inhibition 
Behavioral approach and avoidance has been studied in the context of high-risk 
behaviors such as drinking (Franken & Muris, 2006), smoking (O’Connor, Stewart, & 
Watt, 2009), and self-injury (Jenkins et al, 2014). Those who score high on the behavioral 
approach subscale are more likely to engage in these behaviors than those who score high 
on the inhibition subscale (Carver & White, 1994). Gray (1981) described the behavioral 
approach system (BAS) as that which pushes individuals to strive towards rewards, while 
the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) as the one that works towards avoiding aversive 
stimuli (Gray, 1981). Since BAS was associated with impulsivity (Corr, 2004), and BIS 
with anxious behaviors (Gray, 1982), we were interested in how BIS and BAS may 
influence confidence in autobiographical reports.  
1.3.6. Affective State  
While the effect of mood on retrieval is under debate, many previous studies have 
shown that it can influence the way in which people remember events (Thorley et al, 
2016). On one hand, a negative mood could increase irrelevant thoughts, diminish 
attentional resources, and therefore impair recall (Ellis et al., 1997). In addition, a 
negative mood during the retrieval phase was found to diminish the number of correct 
details remembered, but a negative mood during both encoding and retrieval enhanced 
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memory (Thorley et al, 2016) – a mood congruency effect that has been shown 
repeatedly (Matt et al, 1992). On the other hand, Storbeck and Clore (2005) found that 
when participants were induced into a negative mood, they were less likely to report false 
memories than when they were induced in a positive mood (Storbeck & Clore, 2005), and 
Rusting (2005) found that negative mood can also improve the recall of positive 
memories (Rusting, 1998). When individuals are in a positive mood, they are more likely 
to engage in social interaction, which often translates to an increased likelihood to share 
personal information with someone else (Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980). 
Overall, these findings support the idea that mood and autobiographical memory are 
linked, and that more research on this relationship is warranted.  
1.3.7. Repetition 
Memories are reconstructed every time they are retrieved (Schacter, 1999). The 
factors discussed above – interviewing techniques, prior expectations and knowledge, 
personality, and mood – are all variables, and differ at each instance of retrieval. The 
more times an autobiographical memory is retrieved and then reconsolidated, the more 
opportunities exist for these factors to mold the memory. In an experiment investigating 
the effects of retelling events on memory, Tversky and Marsh (2000) found that on a 
second retelling, participants revealed more details about a hypothetical situation 
involving a roommate. Furthermore, exposing participants to a biased version of the 
roommate story also changed their retellings in accordance to the perspective induced 
(Tversky & Marsh, 2000). When the relationship between repeated recounting and 
memory confidence was investigated, repeated recounting was shown to increase 
confidence in the overall memory (Shaw & McClure, 1996). This finding was valid even 
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when memory accuracy decreased (Hirst et al., 2009). In the context of our study, we had 
no way to control how much participants thought about or discussed the events and film 
plots in the interval between sessions, so we took into consideration the possibility that an 
increase in length at the second retelling could be partially motivated by memory 
repetition.  
1.4 Understanding What Affects Autobiographical Memory Confidence 
1.4.1. The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy  
 The relationship between memory confidence and accuracy has been intensely 
researched, and many studies have found a positive correlation between the two (Wixted 
& Mickes, 2010). Nevertheless, it is difficult to characterize this relationship as it 
depends on the material that is being remembered, on who is doing the remembering, and 
on the different manipulations used to distract or lure participants (Roediger, 2008). 
Previous research has investigated the effect of cueing on remembering using both the 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm and eyewitness-like scenarios. In the 
DRM paradigm, participants are given a list of related words such as “student”, “book”, 
“studying”, “test”, “teacher”, “exam”, and “homework”, and then asked to remember as 
many words from the list as possible (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). More 
often than not, participants also remembered related words that were not presented, or 
lures, such as “school”, with just as much confidence as they remembered words that 
were presented (Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  
In the realm of autobiographical memories, the relationship between confidence 
and accuracy is even more difficult to describe, as confidence can change independently 
of accuracy, and access to an objective account of the memory is rarely available (Lacy 
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and Stark, 2013). As discussed, an individual’s account of an autobiographical memory 
can be influenced by suggestive interviewing techniques from the person inquiring about 
the event, expectations and prior knowledge both at the moment of encoding and at the 
moment of retrieval, personality characteristics, affective state, and repeated retrieval and 
reconsolidation (Lacy and Stark, 2013); similarly, confidence in the details conveyed in 
the account can be swayed by the same factors (Luus & Wells, 1994; Semmler, Brewer, 
& Wells, 2004). In the current research, we assumed that participants described 
autobiographical events and film plots as accurately as they possibly could, since they did 
not have any incentive to do otherwise.  
Autobiographical memories fade with time, and forgetting decreases memory 
accuracy (Hirst et al., 2009). However, confidence may not be affected to the same 
degree, as shown by a study by Schmolck et al. (2000). In that study, participants’ 
memory for the Simpson verdict was assessed 15 and 35 months after it was first tested 
three days after the verdict. After 15 months, only 50% of the recollections were 
accurate, and after 35 months the percentage decreased further to 29% percent; memory 
distortions also increased in-between the testing sessions (Schmolck et al., 2000). As the 
accuracy of these memories decreased, however, participants felt confident enough in 
them to report them. In our study, participants provided accounts of their 
autobiographical memories twice with a 5 to 9 days interval in between, as we looked to 
minimize the effect of time-induced forgetting on memory confidence.  
Last but not least, information that is forgotten initially is deemed to be less 
important than information that is recalled (Castel et al., 2012). If people assign a level of 
importance to event details retrospectively, based on what they mention on a first 
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account, it would follow that they would find anything they remember on a second try to 
be less important to the overall memory (Rhodes et al., 2016).  
1.4.2 Confidence and Accuracy for Highly Emotional Events  
Emotion is a potent modulator of both the encoding and the retrieval processes 
(Buchanan, 2007). Thus, emotion may alter the normal coupling between accuracy and 
subjective confidence – such as it happens in the case of flashbulb memories, in which 
case individuals can be certain that details of their memories are true without that being 
the case (Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Hirst & Phelps, 2016). In the legal context, jurors 
place significant weight in how confident witnesses are when taking their testimony into 
account (Benton et al., 2006). In a 2012 study, Campbell, Patterson and Bybee found that 
86% of sexual assaults are never prosecuted because the victim’s testimony, in its 
incomplete and disjointed form, does not satisfy the jury’s demand for confidence as a 
prerequisite for reliability (Campbell, Patterson, & Bybee, 2012).  
Authentic emotional memories are, however, often disjointed and poorly 
remembered, while memories that are recalled with confidence are often filled with 
inaccurate information (Lacy and Stark, 2013). While emotion can have a positive effect 
on memory processing by increasing one’s attention to the details of the event, it can also 
impair it in cases of elevated intensity (Roozendaal & McGaugh, 2011). In the case of 
traumatic events, for example, emotion can increase the overall understanding of the 
event, as victims of violence generally recollect easily the feelings associated with such 
an act; however, they show difficulties remembering details of the traumatic event 
(Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992). For example, the presence of a weapon decreases the 
ability of an eyewitness to describe both the perpetrator and the scene of the crime 
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(Johnson & Scott, 1976; Kramer, Buckhout, & Eugenio, 1990). While emotional arousal 
may not have any effects on retrieval abilities, it can nevertheless increase what Phelps 
and Sharot (2005) call the “subjective feeling of remembering” (Phelps & Sharot, 2008). 
Even when details of an emotional event are remembered, they may not be 
necessarily accurate (Laney & Loftus, 2005). With an impaired ability to recollect such 
details, confidence in their accuracy and in the accuracy of the overall memory is also 
affected. In a 2009 study of witnesses of an armed robbery, Odinot, Wolters, and van 
Koppen found that although witnesses remembered accurate details with more confidence 
than they remembered inaccurate details, the correlation between confidence and 
accuracy was weak (Odinot, Wolters, & van Koppen, 2009).  
1.4.3. Measuring Confidence  
 There are several ways to measure subjective confidence in memory, or 
metamemory (Krug, 2007). Previous studies have used a Likert 5-point scale, with 1 
corresponding to low confidence and 5 corresponding to high confidence (Perfect & 
Hollins, 1996; Busey et al., 2000), a 1-100 % scale broken in several intervals (Bornstein 
& Zickafoose, 1999, or other kinds of scales (Luna & Martín-Luengo, 2012; Kvidera & 
Koutstaal, 2008). In the current study, we used the three-point scale (Low, Medium, 
High), as we believed it would be sensitive enough to capture participants’ confidence in 
individual details of their narratives.  
1.5 Language as a mirror of confidence in autobiographical memories  
1.5.1. Linguistic analysis  
Autobiographical narratives are a reliable measure of how individuals remember 
events in their lives, and analyzing the language used to describe such events can give 
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insight into their physical and mental states (Gottschalk & Gleser, 1969; Rosenberg & 
Tucker, 1978; Stiles, 1992). Linguistic processing technologies have also been used as a 
treatment tool to follow cognitive and emotional changes throughout psychotherapy 
(McCarthy, Caputi, & Grenyer, 2017). For example, the use of positive emotion words as 
well as words indicating causal thinking has been linked to better health outcomes 
(Pennebaker & Francis, 1996), while the increased use of negative words has been 
associated with transitions in people’s lives (Valdés et al., 2010).  
1.5.2. The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) as a tool  
 The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 2015 (Pennebaker et al., 2015) is 
a dictionary-based package that reads textual input and classifies words into various 
psychologically-relevant categories. Each category is defined as a list of words and word-
stems. Affective and cognitive mechanisms can be detected in the language that people 
use by analyzing the use of certain categories such as Affective or Cognitive (Pennebaker 
& Francis, 1996). For example, the use of affective words – words that describe positive 
and negative emotional states, such as “nice”, “hurt”, and “crying” – can give insight into 
the emotional intensity of the memory (Rubin et al., 2008).  
Cognitive words mark the existence of an underlying cognitive process, that is, 
one that has as a goal the justification, organizing, and understanding of previous events 
(Boals & Rubin, 2011). Individuals use cognitive words when they are trying to make 
sense of events and behaviors. Examples of cognitive words include “think”, “should”, 
and “because”. The overarching category of Cognitive Words contains several 
subcategories, one of which is Certainty words. Since we also measured subjective 
confidence using confidence ratings, we were interested to see how confidence 
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manifested itself in the language participants used. LIWC has been previously validated 
(Kahn et al, 2007; Bantum & Owen, 2009).  
1.6 Aims and Hypotheses  
In an attempt to recreate the pressures placed on eyewitnesses when they are 
asked to testify, the current study describes changes in the quantity and quality of 
information retrieved following an instruction to maximize quantity.  We measured the 
quantity of information as the number of facts mentioned during each of two sessions, 
first allowing participants to reveal as much as they wanted, and then asking them to 
provide all the details that they can remember, even those not mentioned in the previous 
account. We measured confidence by asking participants to rate their confidence in 
details mentioned only during the first session, only during the second session, or in 
details that repeated across sessions. 
For the first session of the study, participants were allowed to narrate as much or 
as little as they wanted about sad and happy events that happened to them, and about sad 
and happy films they watched. The manipulation was introduced during the second 
session, when they were asked to describe the same events and film plots once again, this 
time including all the details that they can remember about each. We were tracking 
details that appeared only during the first interview, details that appeared only during the 
second interview, and details that were repeated across interviews. 
In order to analyze the relationship between personality, disclosure, and memory 
confidence, participants in our study will complete a battery of personality questionnaires 
assessing the five-factor model dimensions (TIPI), rumination (RRQ), perfectionism 
(APS-R), mood (PANAS), and behavioural inhibition (BIS/BAS). To add a further 
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dimension to this research, we will also analyse the language that individuals use to 
describe autobiographical memories, as previous research suggests that information about 
the physical and mental states of individuals permeates the language they use (Gottschalk 
& Gleser, 1969; Stiles, 1992) using LIWC. 
We tested the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Participants provide longer and more detailed accounts of personal events 
following a request to do so.  
 To quantify the increase in narrative output, we compared the word counts for 
narratives from each section, as well as the number of statements generated for the 
confidence judgment questionnaires. We predicted that significantly more details would 
be repeated across the two sessions than only mentioned during one or the other. 
Furthermore, we also expected that the number of new statements generated for the 
second session would correlate positively with the increase in the number of words for 
each event session.  
Hypothesis 2: Participants’ confidence in details added under the pressure to provide as 
much information as possible is lower than in details mentioned in a no-pressure 
condition. In addition, confidence and intensity scores attributed to the overall event 
correlate with confidence scores attributed to individual details of the respective 
accounts. 
We asked participants to rate their confidence in details mentioned only during 
the first session (Old), details mentioned only during the second session (New), and 
details mentioned during both sessions (Repeated). We predicted that participants would 
be less confident in New details than in Old and Repeated details. We used participants’ 
	 18	 
overall memory confidence ratings on Autobiographical Memory Questionnaires to 
correlate with discrete details of the corresponding accounts.  
Hypothesis 3: There are correlations between personality characteristics and the 
quantity and quality of information retrieved.  
We hypothesized that these personality effects on confidence are present at both 
session times, and maintained our approach as exploratory to describe the direction and 
size of these effects. 
Hypothesis 4: The language in participants’ accounts is consistent with participants’ 
subjective assessment of their confidence. 
We used LIWC to quantify participants’ use of affective and cognitive language. 
We predicted that autobiographical memories contain more affective and more cognitive 
language than film plot accounts, and that the more cognitive and affective words 
participants use in their event narratives, the higher confidence ratings they give on single 
details of their autobiographical memories and film plots.  
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2. Methods  
2.1. Research Design 
The study employed a within subjects design by which all participants completed 
both the experimental condition, an autobiographical memory recall task, and the control 
condition, a movie plot recall task. Data was collected at two time points separated by a 
period of five to nine days, and through a personalized confidence judgements 
questionnaire sent to each participant after the conclusion of the second session. The 
present study was approved by the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee 
(UTREC) at the University of St Andrews and carried out in accordance with guidelines 
provided by UTREC (Appendix A).  
2.2. Participants 
Fifty-one participants (38 females, 13 males; mean age = 21.20 years, SE = 0.31) 
were recruited through an online participant recruitment system at the University of St 
Andrews. All participants consented to participate in the study, completed both 
experimental sessions, and were reimbursed with £10 for their time. Thirty of these 
participants completed confidence questionnaires distributed by email via the Qualtrics 
platform after the second session (25 females, 5 males; mean age = 21.17, SE = 0.34). No 
significant differences in age, personality characteristics, and narrative output, as 
quantified by number of words per narrative, were found between females and males (all 
ps > .053). The subsequent analyses were therefore conducted on the entire sample 
regardless of sex. Demographic and personality characteristics of the study population are 
presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Demographics and Personality Profile of the Study Population 
 
 
 
Note: TIPI = Ten-Item Personality Inventory; BAS = Behavioral Approach System; BIS 
= Behavioral Inhibition System; APS-R = Almost Perfect Scale-Revised  
 
2.3. Materials  
2.3.1. Personality Scales 
Participants completed a battery of five personality scales in the order listed 
below. 
Scale Subscale M (SE) 
TIPI Extraversion 
Agreeableness 
4.28 (0.17) 
4.88 (0.13) 
 Conscientiousness 4.99 (0.16) 
 Emotional Stability 3.95 (0.16) 
 Openness to Experience 5.55 (0.15) 
 
Rumination Score  51.04 (1.82) 
 
Affect Positive 31.92 (0.82) 
 Negative 21.63 (1.03) 
 
BAS Drive 11.39 (0.32) 
 Fun Seeking 12.24 (0.32) 
 Reward Responsiveness 17.22 (0.29) 
 
BIS  21.98 (0.53) 
 
APS-R Standards 40.24 (0.78) 
 Order 19.98 (0.58) 
 Discrepancy 51.48 (2.40) 
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TIPI (Ten-Item Personality Inventory) (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann Jr., 2003) is 
a quick, easy-to-administer measure of the Big-Five personality dimensions, and has been 
used in many studies looking to enhance methodology (Holmes, 2010). As explained by 
its creators, the scale was built as a short instrument meant to optimize validity, not to 
perform highly in terms of alpha and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003); the authors’ claim is supported (Furnham, 2008; Holmes, 
2010).  
 RRQ (Ruminative Response Scale) (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) was used to 
assess rumination tendencies. Previous studies demonstrated good reliability and validity 
in various populations (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Erdur-Baker & Bugay, 2010; Extremera 
& Fernández-Berrocal, 2006; Hasegawa, 2013), including when used in individuals 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder (Parola et al, 2017). 
PANAS (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) provided an evaluation of mood by using two 10-item scales measuring both 
positive and negative affect. PANAS has been shown to be reliable and valid by several 
previous studies (Crawford & Henry, 2004; Crocker, 1997; Harmon-Jones et al, 2009). 
APS-R (Almost Perfect Scale Revised (Slaney et al, 1996; Slaney et al, 2001) to 
measure perfectionism using three variables – High Standards, Order, and Discrepancy. 
The psychometric properties of the scale have been analyzed (Vandiver & Worrell, 2002; 
Mobley, Slaney, & Rice, 2005; Diamantopoulou & Platsidou, 2014), and the research 
indicates that the APS-R is a valid and reliable scale to assess the three different aspects 
of perfectionism.  
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 BIS/BAS (Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Approach System Scales) 
(Carver & White, 1994) is a 24-item self-report questionnaire used to describe two 
motivational systems underling behavior, as suggested by its name: the inhibition, or 
avoidance system, which captures the tendency to disengage from something unpleasant, 
and an approach system, which regulates moving towards something desired. The 
BIS/BAS scale has been validated in studies with undergraduate samples as well as 
studies with offenders (Newman et al, 2005; Poythress et al, 2009). 
Appendices B-F contain copies of these scales.  
2.3.2. Autobiographical Memory and Film Plot Interviews  
 Participants completed the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ) 
(Appendix G), which posed in-depth questions about the properties and intensity of the 
memory, for each event described (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). They also 
completed the Film Plot Questionnaire (FPQ) (Appendix H) – a modified version of the 
AMQ adapted to fit questions about participants’ memories of the film plots – for each 
film described. 
2.3.3. Confidence Questionnaires  
After the conclusion of the second session, each participant was asked to 
complete a personalized confidence judgement questionnaire sent through email. 
2.4. Experimental Procedure 
2.4.1. First Session 
Figure 1 outlines the experimental procedure. The first session started with the 
experimenter explaining the research and participants consenting to participation, 
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followed by the completion of the psychometric battery described above. Participants 
needed approximately 10 to 15 minutes to complete these steps.  
 Participants then completed both the autobiographical memory recall task and the 
film plot recall task. We first asked participants to list either five happy and five sad 
events that happened to them, or five happy and five sad films they watched in the space 
provided on a form. Participants did not receive any restrictions on the time periods when 
these events had to have occurred or films had to be watched. The form was two-sided, 
with one side containing space to list events and the other side containing space to list 
films. Half of the participants were assigned to list events first, and were subsequently 
interviewed about the events listed; they were then asked to complete the reverse side of 
the form containing space to list films, and were next interviewed about the plots of the 
films listed. The opposite happened when participants were assigned to start with the film 
list first. We varied both the type of memory participants started with (autobiographical 
or film plot) and the valence of the memory (happy or sad).  
Participants were asked to provide an oral description of one of the happy events 
and one of the sad events with the following command: “I want you to think about 
[randomly chosen happy event/sad event]. Can you tell me what happened then?” In turn, 
the command used for obtaining the description of one of the happy film plots and one of 
the sad film plots was: “I want you to think about [randomly chosen happy film/sad film]. 
Can you tell me the plot of this film?” The interviews were audio-recorded, and no time 
limit for answering the question was enforced. After describing the first event, 
participants completed the AMQ (Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire) (Rubin, 
Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003) specifically for that event, before describing the second 
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event and completing a second AMQ. The same protocol was followed for the film plots, 
but the FPQ (Film Plot Questionnaire) was distributed after each film plot was described. 
At the end of the session, participants completed a short mathematical distraction task of 
subtracting a digit for three minutes, which was meant to improve mood by loading 
working memory (Van Dillen and Koole, 2007).  
2.4.2. Second Session 
Participants returned for the second session the following week. The researcher 
brought back the forms where participants listed events and films. Upon being showed 
their respective form, participants were asked to report once again about the same two 
events and film plots, but this time they were encouraged to retrieve all the details that 
they were able to think of. The command used during the second session was: “Last week 
you told me about [insert event/film]. I would like you to tell me the same story, but this 
time please make sure that you include all the details that you can remember, including 
details not previously mentioned for any reason.” The interviewer placed a vocal 
emphasis on the word “all”; furthermore, when participants stopped talking, they were 
asked if their report contained everything that they remembered in order to create an 
additional pressure for including as many details as possible. They once again completed 
an AMQ for each event report and a FPQ for each film plot report they provided, and 
finished the session with the short mathematical distraction task.  
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Figure 1. Experimental Procedure 
 
 
2.5. Transcription of the interviews  
 The researcher listened to the recorded interviews and transcribed them verbatim.  
2.6. Confidence judgement questionnaires  
Two accounts were provided for each happy and sad autobiographical memory, 
and two descriptions for each happy and sad film plot. Therefore, a total of eight 
narratives were collected from each participant (one version of the happy 
autobiographical memory from Session 1, another version of the happy autobiographical 
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memory from Session 2; etc.). The researcher and one other trained individual had access 
to the transcripts of the interviews, with the second coder encountering the data only once 
it was anonymized. The coders read the Session 1 and Session 2 transcripts for each event 
and film plot, and extracted individual pieces of information comprising specific details 
of the respective autobiographical memory and film plot. These details answered 
questions related to the who, what, where, and when of the events and film plots.  Coders 
aimed to extract 20 details from each set of transcripts, but the maximum number of 
details was extracted if the transcripts did not contain sufficient information. For 
example, a pair of short narratives of a happy memory might have contained only enough 
information for five statements. On the opposite hand, some pairs of longer narratives 
contained information for more than 20 statements, in which case the coders aimed to 
write the set maximum of 20 statements using details mentioned in all parts of the 
description homogenously (i.e. we aimed for a similar emphasis on details mentioned in 
the first part of the interviews as on details mentioned in the middle or end parts of the 
interviews). These details were compiled as lists of statements and used to create 
personalised questionnaires on Qualtrics that were then sent to each participant’s personal 
email. Participants had to make a confidence judgment about every statement itemised in 
their questionnaire by choosing one of three confidence options (low, medium, or high). 
Appendix I contains an example of a pair of accounts for the participant’s sad event, and 
the associated confidence judgement statements that were sent to the participant.  
We kept track of statements that appeared only in the first telling of the events 
and film plots (only mentioned during Session 1, referred to as “Old”), which only 
appeared in the second telling (only during Session 2, referred to as “New”), and which 
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appeared in both sessions (referred to as “Repeated”). A detail was counted as “New” if it 
contained information about the time, location, emotional reaction to the event, other 
participants etc., that was not mentioned in first account. A detail was counted as 
“Repeated” if the information it contained did not add anything new to the original 
account, i.e. anything that would change the listener’s mental image of the event. We also 
tracked any mention of incongruent details (example in Appendix I).  
2.7. Analyses 
The narratives collected were analyzed using LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count) (Pennebacker et al., 2007). LIWC is a dictionary-based package that read textual 
input and classifies words into various psychologically-relevant categories, such as the 
Affective Processes cluster, Cognitive Processes Cluster, Pronouns, and others. For our 
purposes, we will use LIWC to describe the prevalence of affect and cognitive processing 
language primarily, and potentially analyse other language trends if any arise post-
analysis.  
Both correlational and categorical analyses were employed in the current study. 
We used categorical analyses to assess the change in the quantity and quality of 
information retrieved. We used correlational analyses to investigate the relationship 
between personality characteristics, cognitive and affective language, and the quantity 
(number of words) and quality (confidence ratings) of information retrieved.  
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3. Results 
3.1. Changes in narrative output following the manipulation 
 We hypothesized that individuals would provide longer and more detailed 
accounts of personal events as well as of film plots when instructed to do so. We 
measured the change in narrative output in two ways: by number of words and by number 
of statements generated for the confidence questionnaires later distributed to all 
participants.  
3.1.1 Number of Words 
The average number of words per narrative was 235.2 words (SE = 11.03). The narratives 
delivered by participants when instructed to give as many details as possible were 
significantly longer than the narratives provided when they did not receive the instruction 
(Session 1: 156.2 words, Session 2: 314.2 words, t(50) = -7.27, p < 0.001, d = -0.96). 
Table 2 contains of breakdown of the average number of words and statements per 
narrative according to memory type (Autobiographical Memory or Film Plot) and 
valence (Happy or Sad).  
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Table 2. Number of Words and Statements According to Memory Type and Valence 
 
 Number of words  
(N=51; M (SE)) 
Old 
statements 
New 
statements 
Repeated 
statements 
 Session 1 Session 2    
Memory 
Happy 138.9 (14.3) 272.9 (29.5) 3.0 (0.4) 7.2 (0.6) 5.2 (0.5) 
Sad 152.2 (23.0) 288.0 (38.6) 2.5 (0.4) 6.6 (0.6) 5.3 (0.5) 
Film 
Happy 170.0 (15.1) 383.3 (46.8) 1.8 (0.3) 7.3 (0.6) 8.0 (0.6) 
Sad 163.6 (13.6) 312.8 (32.7) 1.8 (0.3) 6.2 (0.5) 7.6 (0.6) 
 
Note: Old statements were based on details only mentioned during Session 1. New 
statements were based on details only mentioned during Session 2.  Repeated statements 
were based on details that appeared during both sessions. 
 
We further wanted to investigate if valence and memory type had an effect on the 
length of the narratives (Figure 1). In a 2 (Valence: Happy; Sad) x 2 (Memory Type: 
Autobiographical Memory; Movie Plot) x 2 (Session: Session 1; Session 2) within 
subjects factorial ANOVA there were no significant main effects of valence, F(1, 50) = 
0.666, p = 0.428, on narrative length. There was a significant main effect of session, with 
Session 2 accounts being longer than Session 1 accounts, F(1,50) = 52.81, p < 0.001, η2p 
= 0.514 (Session 1: M = 156.2 words, SE = 13.5; Session 2: M = 314.3 words, SE = 29.7), 
and a significant main effect of memory type, with film plot accounts being longer than 
event memory narrations, F(1,50) = 6.68, p = 0.013, η2p = 0.118 (Autobiographical 
Memories: M = 213.0 words, SE = 23.0; Film plots: M = 257.4 words, SE = 21.2). We 
found a significant interaction between memory type and session, F(1,50) = 4.17, p = 
0.047, η2p = 0.077, which could be explained by the larger increase in number of words 
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per account for the film plots following the manipulation (Autobiographical memory, 
Session 1: M = 145.6, SE = 17.6; Session 2: M = 280.4, SE = 31.9 and Film Plot, Session 
1: M = 166.8, SE = 12.4; Session 2: M = 348.0, SE = 32.8). No other significant 
interactions were found: Valence x Memory Type, F(1,50) = 2.0, p = 0.162; Valence x 
Session, F(1,50) = 1.89, p = 0.176; Valence x Memory Type x Session, F(1,50) = 2.07, p 
= 0.156. These results suggest that participants provide more detailed accounts of both 
their autobiographical and their film plot memories when they are instructed to provide as 
much information as possible, which is consistent with the purpose of our manipulation. 
Interestingly, participants talked more at length about film plots than about their 
autobiographical memories, although follow-up paired samples t-tests showed that 
reports of autobiographical memories, collapsed across valence, were significantly longer 
for the second session than for the first (Session 1: M = 145.6, SE = 17.6 and Session 2, 
M = 280.4, SE = 31.9, t(50) = -5.81 , p < .001, d = - 0.73). That is, the main effect of 
session is maintained despite the significant interaction between memory type and 
session in the within subjects factorial ANOVA (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Narrative Length Before and After the Manipulation. Bars show ±1 SEM. 
 
3.1.2. Number of Statements Generated  
The mean number of Old, New, and Repeated statements is summarized in Table 
1. We hypothesized that the statements produced by the researcher for the confidence 
judgment questionnaires would contain significantly more Repeated details (that 
appeared during both Session 1 and Session 2 accounts) than Old details (that only 
appeared in Session 1 accounts) and New details (that appeared only in Session 2 
accounts). For an initial understanding of the factors affecting the number of statements 
generated, we performed a 2 (Valence: Happy; Sad) x 2 (Memory Type: 
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Autobiographical Memory; Film Plot) x 3 (Type of Detail: Old; New; Repeated) within 
subjects factorial ANOVA. We found significant main effects of valence, F(1, 49) = 9.40, 
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.161 (Happy: M = 5.41 statements, SE = 0.16; Sad: M = 4.98 
statements, SE = 0.16), memory type, F(1, 49) = 4.74, p = 0.034, η2p = 0.088 
(Autobiographical Memory: M = 4.97 statements, SE = 0.20 ; Film Plot: 5.42 statements, 
SE = 0.16), and type of detail F(1, 49) = 56.80, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.703 (Old: M = 2.29 
statements, SE = 0.23 ; New: M = 6.77 statements, SE = 0.40 ; Repeated: M = 6.54 
statements, SE = 0.42) on the number of statements generated. There was a significant 
interaction between memory type x type of detail, F(1,49) = 23.17, p < 0.001, η2p = 
0.491. No other significant interactions were found: valence x memory type, F(1,49) = 
0.34, p = 0.565; valence x type of detail, F(1,49) = 0.77, p = 0.471; valence x memory 
type x type of detail, F(1,49) = 0.58, p = 0.567. Figure 3 shows the distribution of Old, 
New, and Repeated details for happy and sad memories and happy and sad film plots.  
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Figure 3. Number of Old, New, and Repeated Statements by Memory Type and Valence. 
Bars show ±1 SEM. 
 
Additionally, paired-samples t-test revealed a significant difference between the 
number of Old statements and Repeated statements, as well as Old and New statements, 
regardless of valence and memory type (Happy Memories: Old and Repeated: t(49)= -
3.32, p = 0.002, d = -0.67, Old and New : t(49) = -5.33, p < 0.001, d = -1.19; Sad 
Memories: Old and Repeated: t(49)= -3.88, p < 0.001, d = -0.88, Old and New : t(49) = -
5.68, p < 0.001, d = 1.21; Happy Film Plots: Old and Repeated: t(49)= -8.42, p < 0.001, d 
= -1.87, Old and New : t(50) = -7.74, p < 0.001, d = -1.72; Sad Film Plots: Old and 
Repeated: t(50)= -7.81, p < 0.001, d = -1.7, Old and New : t(50) = -7.92, p < 0.001, d = -
1.45; all relevant means can be found in Table 1). Our findings suggest that most of the 
information present in each of the four sets of narratives collected was either repeated 
across sessions, or was only introduced once the request for as many details as possible 
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was made. Correspondingly, there was significantly less information that was only 
mentioned during the first account.  
We conducted correlational analyses to test the hypothesis that the number of 
New statements will correlate positively with the increase in number of words per 
account between sessions, regardless of memory type and valence. Indeed, we found that 
the increase the number of words was positively correlated with the number of New 
statements generated for each participant for all conditions except Happy Film Plots (p > 
0.05) : Happy Memories: r(50) = .53, p < 0.001; Sad Memories: r(50) = .51, p < 0.001; 
Sad Film Plots: r(50) = .46, p = 0.001). Therefore, the instruction to provide more details 
had the scouted effect, increasing both the length and the amount of detail provided in the 
accounts given by participants.  
 The findings above support our hypothesis that individuals will provide longer 
and more detailed accounts after an instruction to give as many details as possible, as 
measured by both number of words and number of statements generated for the 
confidence questionnaires. 
3.2. Confidence 
3.2.1. Differences between confidence in Old, New, and Repeated details 
We hypothesized that confidence ratings on New statements will be significantly 
lower than confidence ratings on Old and Repeated statements. For an initial 
understanding of the factors affecting confidence, we performed a 2 (Valence: Happy; 
Sad) x 2 (Memory Type: Autobiographical Memory; Film Plot) x 3 (Type of Detail: Old; 
New; Repeated) within subjects factorial ANOVA, but we did not find any significant 
effects or interactions (valence, F(1,16) = 1.47, p = 0.245; memory type,  F(1,16) = 0.29, 
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p = 0.599 ; type of detail, F(1,16) = 2.67, p = 0.104; valence x memory type, F(1,16) = 
1.98 , p = 0.180; valence x type of detail, F(1,16) = 0.15, p = 0.863; memory type x type 
of detail, F(1,16) = 0.208, p = 0.82; valence x memory type x type of detail, F(1,16) = 
1.68, p = 0.222). After examining the mean confidence values for Old, New, and 
Repeated statements and observing that mean confidence in Old details was lower than 
mean confidence in Repeated details by a decimal, we furthered the analysis by 
collapsing groups across valence and memory type. We found a significant difference 
between confidence in Old details and confidence in Repeated details, t(29) = -3.508, p = 
0.001, d = -0.50 (Confidence Old: 2.74, SE = 0.04; Confidence Repeated: 2.88, SE = 
0.02). No significant differences were found between Old and New details, t(29) = 0.471, 
p = 0.641, and between New and Repeated details, t(29) = -1.506, p = 0.143 (Figure 4A).  
When looking only at details present in the autobiographical memories, but not in the 
film plots, we once again found a significant difference between confidence in Old details 
and confidence in Repeated details, t(27) = -4.10, p < 0.001, d = -0.885 (Confidence Old: 
2.75, SE = 0.04; Confidence Repeated: 2.91, SE = 0.02), but no difference between Old 
and New details (t(27) = 0.378, p = 0.709) or New and Repeated (t(27) = -1.61, p = 
0.119) (Figure 4B). These findings suggest that participants were more confident in 
details that they repeated across sessions than in details they only mentioned during the 
first session. 
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A)                                                                    B)   
             
Figure 4. A) Confidence in Old, New, and Repeated Details of Autobiographical 
Memories and Film Plots. A significant difference was found between confidence in Old 
and Repeated details B) Confidence in Old, New, and Repeated Details of 
Autobiographical Memories only. The difference between confidence in Old and 
Repeated details was statistically significant. Bars show ±1 SEM. 	
3.2.2. Correlations between confidence in details and confidence in the general memory 	
Our hypothesis was that the confidence and intensity scores that participants 
attributed to each autobiographical account and film plot, as measured by the AMQ and 
FPQ respectively, will correlate with the confidence scores on the respective individual 
details of each account. We focused on “New” details only because we thought that those 
would be most relevant – if participants are confident in newly added information even 
after the demand, then they should feel more confident about the overall memory, and 
these newly added details simply “slipped away” the first instance of recall. Confidence 
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scores in “New” details correlated with a higher score in “reliving” ( r(22) = 0.427, p = 
0.042) and “remembering the setting” ( r(22) = 0.446, p = 0.033) for Happy Memories 
during the second session. That is, the more confident participants are in details 
mentioned only in the second session, the more vivid the entire happy memory is rated 
after the instruction. A similar trend was observed for sad memories, with higher scores 
on “New” statements being positively correlated with scores on “reliving” ( r(22)=0.503, 
p = 0.014), “hear” ( r(22) = 0.681, p < 0.001), “spatial layout” ( r(22) = 0.601, p = 0.002), 
“remember rather than know” ( r(22) = 0.745, p < 0.001), “comes in words” ( r(22) = 
0.538, p = 0.008), “coherent story” ( r(22) = 0.641, p = 0.001). This finding suggests that 
higher confidence in details of autobiographical memories sponsor a memory that is then 
rated as more vivid and is reported as more trustworthy.  
3.3. Personality Characteristics and Autobiographical Retrieval  
3.3.1. Rumination 
We hypothesized that individuals who score high on rumination would have a 
significantly smaller increase in narrative output during the second session, as measured 
by both number of words and number of new statements. We found a significant negative 
correlation between rumination scores and difference in the number of words between the 
first and second session for both Happy Memories ( r(50) = -0.275, p = 0.050) and Happy 
Film Plots ( r(50) = -0.330, p = 0.018), but no significant correlation between rumination 
scores and difference in words between the first and the second session for Sad Memories 
and Sad Film Plots (Figure 5, A-D).  
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A)                                                                      B) 
      
C)       D) 
      
 
Figure 5. Correlations Between the Change in Number of Words from Session 1 to 
Session 2 and Rumination Scores. Line of best fit is represented in each figure.  
Note: A positive Δ corresponds to an increase in narrative output, as measured in number 
of words, between Session 1 and Session 2 accounts. Accordingly, a negative Δ 
corresponds to a decrease. 
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(Session 2 only: r(51) = -0.323, p = 0.021), “Story Coherence” (Session 2 only: r(51) = -
0.319, p = 0.023), “Court of Law” (Session 2 only: r(51) = -0.323, p = 0.021), 
“Imaginary to Real” (Session 2 only: r(51) = -.0.384, p = 0.006) for Happy 
Autobiographical Memories. Only one significant negative correlation was found 
between rumination scores and “Comes in Words” scores for Sad Memories (Session 2 
only: r(51) = -0.338, p = 0.015). Similarly, significantly negative correlations were found 
between the corresponding question scores on the FPQ for Happy Film Plots for “Comes 
in Words” (Session 2 only: r(51) = -0.315, p = 0.024) and “Travel Back in Time” 
(Session 2 only: r(51) = -0.316, p = 0.024), but not for Sad Film Plots (all ps > 0.05). 
These results suggest that ruminators have more difficulties accessing memories of happy 
events than memories of sad events, and that they have a subjective awareness of this 
difficulty as well.  
3.3.2. Affect 
We conducted correlational analyses to test the hypothesis that Negative Affect 
scores will correlate negatively with narrative output, and that Positive Affect scores will 
correlate positively with narrative output. The Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(PNAS) used measured participants’ mood over the past few weeks, and provided a 
numeric value for their inclination towards a positive affect or a negative affect. We 
found negative correlations between Negative Affect scores and number of words per 
account for both Happy and Sad Memories for both sessions (Happy Memory, Session 1: 
r(50) = -0.356, p = 0.010 and Session 2: r(50) = -0.299, p = 0.033; Sad memory, Session 
1: r(50) = -0.288, p = 0.040 and Session 2: r(50) = -0.280, p = 0.047) (Figure 6, A-D). 
Negative affect did not correlate with narrative output for Sad Film Plots for either 
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session and Happy Film Plots for Session 1 (all ps > 0.05), but it did correlate negatively 
with narrative output for Happy Film Plots during the Sesssion 2 ( r(50) = -0.331, p = 
0.018). These findings suggest that the higher participants scored on the negative affect 
scale, the less autobiographical information they provided for either one of the sessions.  
A)                                                                      B)  
      
C)         D) 
     
Figure 6. Correlations between the number of words for Session 1 and Session 2 and 
Negative Affect scores. Line of best fit is represented.  
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3.4. Linguistic analysis of Autobiographical and Film Plot accounts 
3.4.1. Affective language  
We used LIWC to determine the amount of affective language contained in each 
account collected. We then tested the hypothesis that autobiographical memory accounts 
contain more affective language than film plot accounts. However, in a 2 (Valence: 
Happy; Sad) x 2 (Memory Type: Autobiographical Memory; Movie Plot) x 2 (Session: 
Session 1; Session 2) within subjects factorial ANOVA there were no significant main 
effects of valence, F(1, 50) = 0.373, p = 0.544, and memory type, F(1, 50) = 0.093, p = 
0.762), on the amount of affective language, but there was a significant effect of session, 
with Session 2 accounts containing significantly less affective language than Session 1 
accounts F(1,50) = 8.087, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.139 (Session 1: M = 4.661, SE = 0.212; 
Session 2: M = 4.366, SE = 0.186). No significant interactions were found: Valence x 
Memory Type, F(1,50) = 0.522, p = 0.473; Session x Valence, F(1,50) = 1.996, p = 
0.164;  Session x Memory Type, F(1,50) = 2.811, p = 0.100; Session x Valence x 
Memory Type, F(1,50) = 0.014, p = 0.907. An observation of the mean percentage of 
affective words in Session 1 and Session 2 accounts of autobiographical memories led us 
to also conduct a t-test, which revealed that Session 2 accounts of autobiographical 
memories contain significantly more affective language than Session 1 accounts, t(50) = 
3.91, p < 0.001, d = 0.44 (Session 1: M = 4.99, SE = 0.25; Session 2: M = 4.26, SE = 
0.225). These results suggest that participants use less affective language in their 
autobiographical and film plot accounts during the second session, thus decreasing the 
amount of emotional content in the face of a request to emphasize detail. This effect 
remains accurate for autobiographical memories only (Figure 7, A-B).  
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A) 
 
 
 
B)  
        
 
Figure 7. A) Affective Language in Session 1 and Session 2 Accounts. B) Session 1 
Autobiographical Memory accounts contain significantly more affective language than 
Session 2 accounts. Bars show ±1 SEM. 
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Happy memory accounts contained significantly more positive emotion words 
than sad memory accounts during both sessions, Session 1: t(50) = 5.04, p < 0.001, d =  
1.02 (Happy Memories: M = 4.23, SE = 0.33; Sad Memories: M = 2.16, SE = 0.23), 
Session 2 : t(50) = 6.164, p < 0.001, d = 0.96 (Happy Memories: M = 3.69, SE = 0.27; 
Sad Memories: M = 2.1; SE = 0.2), and sad memory accounts contained significantly 
more negative emotion words than happy memory accounts during both sessions, Session 
1: t(50) = - 6.847, p < 0.001, d = -1.32 (Happy Memories: M = 0.6, SE = 0.143; Sad 
Memories: M = 2.83, SE = 0.3), Session 2: t(50) = -6.806, p < 0.001, d = -.807 (Happy 
Memories: M = 0.68, SE = 0.1; Sad Memories: M = 1.99; SE = 0.18). A similar finding 
was revealed for happy and sad film plot accounts. Happy film plots contained 
significantly more positive emotion words than sad film plot accounts during both 
sessions, Session 1: t(50) = 2.53, p = 0.015, d = 0.45 (Happy Film Plots: M = 3.24, SE = 
0.34; Sad Film Plots: M = 2.24, SE = 0.27), and Session 2: t(50) = 3.04, p = 0.004, d = 
0.64 (Happy Film Plots: M = 2.93, SE = 0.24; Sad Film Plots: M = 1.98; SE = 0.18). Sad 
film plot accounts contained significantly more negative emotion words than happy film 
plot accounts during Session 1: t(50) = -3.00, p = 0.004, d = -0.62 (Happy Film Plots: M 
= 1.38, SE = 0.21; Sad Film Plots: M = 2.35, SE = 0.23), but not during Session 2: t = -
1.2, p = 0.236. Figure 8 presents a breakdown of the affective language used by 
participants in their accounts, and suggests that the task had the expected effect on the use 
of language.  
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A)                                                                 B) 
     
 
C)              D) 
    
              
 
Figure 8. Positive and Negative Emotion words in Session 1 and Session 2 accounts for 
A) Happy Autobiographical Memories, B) Sad Autobiographical Memories, C) Happy 
Film Plots, D) Sad Film Plots. Happy autobiographical memories and happy film plots 
contained more positive emotion words than negative emotion words, while sad 
autobiographical memories and sad film plots contained more negative emotion words 
than positive emotion words. Bars show ±1 SEM. 
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3.4.2. Cognitive language 
We tested the hypothesis that autobiographical memories contain more cognitive 
language than film plot narratives. We conducted a 2 (Valence: Happy; Sad) x 2 
(Memory Type: Autobiographical Memory; Film Plot) x 2 (Session: 1;2) within subjects 
factorial ANOVA, and found significant effects of memory type F(1, 50) = 9.13, p = 
0.004, η2p = 0.154 (Autobiographical Memories: M = 12.11, SE = 0.36; Film Plots: M = 
10.99, SE = 0.29) and valence F(1, 50) = 16.22, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.245 (Happy: M = 
10.85, SE = 0.29; Sad: M = 12.25, SE = 0.34). No other significant effects were found 
(Session: F(1,50) = 3.86, p = 0.055, valence x memory type, F(1,50) = 2.62, p = 0.112; 
valence x session, F(1,50) < 0.001, p = 0.986; valence x memory type x session, F(1,50) 
= 0.05, p = 0.820.) These findings suggest that participants use more cognitive language 
when they talk about memories that have personal significance than when they talk about 
film plots, and that sad memories of either type contain more cognitive processing than 
happy memories (Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. Cognitive language in Session 1 and Session 2 accounts. Bars show ±1 SEM. 
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4. Discussion 
 The present study investigated changes in the quantity (number of facts) and 
quality (confidence ratings) of autobiographical memory accounts following an 
instruction to maximize both. In addition, we studied the effect of personality 
characteristics on these two variables, and we looked at how affective and cognitive 
processing manifest in the language participants used. We found that participants 
provided longer and more detailed accounts of personal events following an instruction to 
do so, and that they were more confident in details repeated across sessions than in details 
they only mentioned when first interviewed. Personality characteristics influenced the 
quantity of information retrieved: high ruminators showed a smaller increase in the 
information provided about happy memories, but not sad memories, than low ruminators 
in response to the added pressure; similarly, those who scored high in negative affect 
provided shorter accounts of their autobiographical memories than those who scored low. 
When analyzing language, we found that the amount of emotional content in participants’ 
accounts decreased in the face of a request to emphasize detail, and that autobiographical 
memory accounts contain more cognitive language than film plot accounts.  
 Consistent with our hypothesis, participants provided longer and more detailed 
accounts of their autobiographical memories when instructed to do so. This finding is 
consistent with previous research showing that participants respond to demands from an 
interviewer (Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; Loftus & Bernstein, 2005; Pasupathi, Stallworth, 
& Murdoch, 1998), and serves as a manipulation check for the pressure command we 
proposed. We also found a difference in length between autobiographical memories and 
film plot accounts, with film plot accounts being longer than autobiographical memory 
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accounts. This finding might suggest that describing an autobiographical event engages 
different mechanisms than describing a film plot does, and that the intricate link between 
memory and the self makes describing personal narratives intrinsically different from 
describing impersonal narratives. This finding is interesting in the light of several 
previous studies that used videotaped events – primarily of emotional, negative events, 
such as robberies and crime scenes – to test recall (Turtle & Yuille, 1994; Fisher & 
Cutler, 1995; Brock, Fisher, & Cutler, 1999; Smeets, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2004; 
Odinot & Wolters, 2006; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Krix et al., 2015). It may be that the 
kind of memory tested in these studies is different from authentic memories of negative 
or traumatic events that participants might have experienced. In that case, the conclusions 
about memory confidence and accuracy made by these studies are less generalizable to 
real life scenarios than previously thought.   
Participants had the freedom to think and talk about the memories they recalled 
for this study in the period between sessions. Therefore, exposure to post-event 
information could introduce details not previously recalled, therefore increasing the 
amount of information available for recall at the next solicitation (Benjamin & Ross, 
2011). However, since some details were only remembered during the first session and 
not during the second, differences in retrieval may be mainly attributed to varying 
retrieval conditions (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Future studies could control for any 
effects of repetition by having another group of participants who is asked to relay happy 
and sad events and happy and sad film plots, but who is not pressured to maximize the 
quantity of detail during the second session. That way, we could observe whether 
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repetition alone can increase the length and amount of details present in narratives as 
much as it did in our study, and thus isolate the effects of the pressure command. 
The idea that participants may mentally rewrite the story each time they recall it 
led us to hypothesize that they will be less confident in details added under the pressure 
to provide as much information as possible than in details mentioned in a no-pressure 
condition. Our finding was that participants were significantly more confident in details 
repeated during both sessions than in details mentioned only in one or the other, and is 
consistent with previous conclusions in the field (Shaw & McClure, 1996; Odinot & 
Wolters, 2006; Stanley & Benjamin, 2016). It is possible that less confident details are 
more likely to be forgotten after the first recall, and more likely to be generated following 
the instruction to provide more information, while repeated details are held with more 
confidence during both accounts. Our second finding concerning participants’ subjective 
confidence was that higher confidence scores in details added in the pressure condition 
corresponded to the entire memory being rated as more vivid and trustworthy. 
Incorporating our findings into the model put forth by Shaw & McClure (1996), which 
suggests that repeated recounting increases confidence in the overall memory, we 
propose that repetition may increase confidence in the memory episode by increasing 
confidence in the distinct details that are repeated. In other words, the subjective 
awareness of having access to information that can be retrieved repeatedly may lead 
participants to better trust their ability to remember.  
This finding is relevant because there is a strong belief within the legal system 
that inconsistencies are linked to unreliability (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Kerper, 1997; 
Brewer et al., 1999), and as a result inconsistent accounts are often dismissed (Stanley & 
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Benjamin, 2016). These concerns are partially justified, as it was found that information 
not reported initially but only at a later point was less accurate than information that was 
reported consistently across accounts (Stanley & Benjamin, 2016). Stanley and Benjamin 
(2016) propose the possibility that people are more likely to report details that they are 
confident about initially, and only at later occasions or under additional pressure also 
mention details that they are less certain about (Stanley & Benjamin, 2016). Their 
reasoning fits well with Shaw and McClure’s idea of retrieval fluency, which says that 
subjective ease of retrieval can lead participants to feel more confident about the 
information retrieved, and therefore to give higher confidence judgments (Shaw & 
McClure, 1996).  
Koriat and Goldsmith (1994) distinguish between free and forced reports, and 
warn about the difference in accuracy that may exist between the two (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1994). When asked to report freely, like we did for the first session of our 
study, participants may unconsciously screen for accuracy and report information they 
are confident in. On the contrary, a forced report – which Koriat and Goldsmith define as 
one in which answering all items is required, and which is similar to our command to 
include “all the details remembered” – removes accuracy screening, therefore allowing 
details that would not be mentioned freely to make it into autobiographical accounts 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). Our findings fit this model well, and may suggest that 
autobiographical information that is repeated across different occasions is subjectively 
perceived as being of a higher quality by both the person holding it and by the ones 
receiving it.  
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Based on their personality, some people were more likely to have thought about 
the events described in the interval between session. Accordingly, we found that the more 
rumination tendencies participants showed, the less they increased the amount of 
information added during the second session for their happy memories, but not for their 
sad memories. These findings are consistent with previous research about rumination, 
which shows that rumination is linked to negative thinking patterns (Sansone & Sansone, 
2012). In the context of our study, a focus on negative events would logically decrease 
the ability to rehearse positive events, and therefore less information about happy 
memories would be available for recall. Studies conducted with older adults suggest that 
low rumination tendencies may facilitate the recall of positive memories (Ricarte et al., 
2016), while younger adults, who tend to remember negative events better, may do so 
because of higher rumination tendencies (Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004). Since 
all participants in our study were young adults, with ages ranging between 18 and 28, our 
findings support the idea that young age favors the remembering of negative memories.  
Not only is rumination associated with the quantity of information retrieved, but it 
is also associated with its quality, as ruminators recall less specific autobiographical 
memories than non-ruminators (Sumner, 2012). In the context of eyewitness testimony, 
the finding that rumination is associated with the quantity and quality of information 
retrieved is relevant, as many of those who come forward to testify have been victims of 
trauma and may be affected by posttraumatic stress disorder or depression, two 
conditions often linked to rumination (Williams, 1996; Michael et al., 2006). Previous 
research has shown that positive memories are remembered more holistically than 
negative memories. The increase in the quantity of information provided by ruminant 
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participants about their sad memories may therefore be directly related to the increase in 
detail. If that is so, rumination may be the link between participant’s reaction to the 
pressure command, and influence both the quantity and the quality of information 
retrieved directly.  
Besides rumination tendencies, participants’ mood also impacted the length of the 
accounts retrieved. While we believed that individuals who scored high in negative affect 
would provide more detailed and confident accounts of their sad memories, we did not 
expect to find an effect of negative mood on the quality and quantity of happy memories. 
Instead, we found that those who scored high in negative affect provided shorter accounts 
for both their sad and their happy memories. Therefore, we were not able to replicate the 
mood congruency effect (Matt et al., 1992; Thorley et al., 2016). Our finding supports the 
idea that a negative mood may reduce recall of any autobiographical information 
regardless of valence (Ellis et al., 1997).  
The effect of the manipulation and participants’ personality characteristics was 
also observed in the language used in accounts. We found that participants used less 
affective language in their autobiographical and film plot accounts during the second 
session, thus decreasing the amount of emotional content in the face of a request to 
emphasize detail. To our knowledge, no previous research has addressed the effects of a 
command to prioritize both quantity and quality of information on the emotional content 
of autobiographical memories. Since the use of affective words gives insight into the 
emotional intensity of the memory (Rubin et al., 2008), it follows that accounts given 
under the pressure condition were less emotionally intense, although they were 
remembered in more detail. The exact implications of this finding warrant further 
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research, because events queried during testimony are emotional in nature, and pressure 
to perform is inherent to sworn testimony.  
Participants used more cognitive language in their autobiographical accounts than 
in their film plots accounts. People use cognitive words in their accounts when they are 
actively trying to make sense or organize an event (Boals & Klein, 2005). In a study 
investigating the use of cognitive words, participants who had recently broken up with 
their partners were asked to describe their situations pre-break, during the break-up, and 
after the break-up. The results showed that more cognitive words were used in the break 
up and post-break-up narratives than in the pre-break-up narratives, suggesting that 
participants were actively trying to make sense of the negative event that happened to 
them (Boals & Klein, 2005). Similarly, participants in our study might have been actively 
organizing and trying to understand the autobiographical events they were relaying as 
they were relaying them, and this process manifested itself in the descriptive language 
they used.  
Our second finding regarding the use of cognitive language was that sad accounts 
contained significantly more cognitive language than happy accounts. One possible 
explanation is that sad events require more cognitive processing for organization and 
meaning-making purposes, particularly for self-growth purposes (Ullrich & Lutgendorf, 
2002). Studies conducted by Pennebaker and colleagues repeatedly found that the use of 
cognitive language in narrative accounts seems to be associated with positive outcomes 
(Pennebaker, 1993; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997), 
finding which was also replicated with highly traumatized populations of HIV + adults 
(Rivkin et al., 2006) and sexual assault victims (Alvarez-Conrad, Zoellner, & Foa, 2001).  
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A strength of our experimental paradigm was that we were able to assess both the 
quality and the quantity of the memories retrieved, unlike other experiments that only 
assess one or the other. Koriat and Goldsmith (1994) discuss the confusion that is often 
made between the two, and distinguish between input bound and output bound 
assessments of memory (Koriat and Goldsmith, 1994). Memory reports, as those 
collected in the present study, are output bound – that is, we received the output (the 
report) and are asking questions about the memory (the input), specifically questions 
having to do with the percentage of items remembered that are correct. Stanley and 
Benjamin (2016) call this the “nothing but the truth” part of the oath, and identify it as the 
main avenue for studying eyewitness testimony. In contrast, input bound assessments 
start with the input – such as a list of words to learn or a short film to watch – and 
quantity the amount of information retrieved, thus corresponding with the “whole truth” 
part of the oath (Stanley & Benjamin, 2016). By collecting narrative accounts, we had 
access to objective quantifying of information; by requesting participants to provide 
confidence judgments on distinct details of their memories, we also collected subjective 
reports of confidence. 
A limitation of our study involved the variation in the amount of time between the 
end of the second session and when each participant received his or her confidence 
judgment questionnaire. While we initially tried to send questionnaires within a week 
from the second interview, some participants received their questionnaires several weeks 
after. This could have biased participants’ confidence judgments, since participants who 
received their questionnaires after a longer period of time may have forgotten more and 
therefore be less confident in what they mentioned or failed to mention. Future studies 
	 54	 
could address this limitation by distributing the questionnaires after a fixed amount of 
time.  
 Future studies could also attempt to replicate our findings using manual coding 
conducted by several individuals according to a pre-specified set of rules. The software 
we used in our analysis, although a widely employed and efficient measure of linguistic 
content, is limited. LIWC counts words regardless of context and narrative structure, and 
therefore can easily miss on sarcasm, humor, or any cultural nuances used by speakers or 
narrators. For example, if someone says “I was not pleased”, LIWC would count the 
word “pleased” as a positive emotion word, although the speaker used it to communicate 
being upset (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Another example would be someone saying 
“It was the dark before the dawn” to mean that things got better; LIWC would not capture 
the positive emotion expressed with the usage of the expression. Another way to better 
capture context would be using n-grams, an analysis method in which words are grouped 
and which can better capture context (Oberlander & Gill, 2006).  
The word “truth” is relative when it comes to personal memories, since there is no 
way to verify that an account given by an individual is accurate or not (Bernstein & 
Loftus, 2009). Similarly, testimonies in today’s courts of law are intrinsically vulnerable 
to fundamental memory editing processes. Since they are often taken as crucial evidence 
in criminal cases, they directly affect the judges’ ability to make a correct decision about 
punishment (Buratti, Allwood, & Johansson, 2014). If an eyewitness presents false 
information with the conviction of it being the true, courses of lives can be steered. By 
investigating the relationship between memory confidence and response to demand 
characteristics under the form of pressure to provide as much information as possible, this 
	 55	 
study provides a s step forward into ensuring that the current misunderstandings are 
corrected and that the potential harm that false testimony could cause to individuals and 
society is diminished.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 We found that participants retrieved more information when pressured to do so, 
and that they were more confident in details they repeated across sessions than in details 
they only mentioned once. Furthermore, we found that rumination and negative mood 
affected the quantity of information retrieved, but not the quality. Ruminators increased 
the length of their reports of happy autobiographical memories significantly less than 
low-ruminators, and those scoring high in negative affect provided shorter 
autobiographical accounts. Last but not least, participants used less affective language 
under the pressure to prioritize both the quantity and quality of information, and more 
cognitive language in their autobiographical memory accounts than in their film plot 
accounts. This is the only study, to our knowledge, to study the direct effects of the 
pressure to provide “the whole truth and nothing but the truth” on the quantity and quality 
of information retrieved as well as on the language used in narrative accounts of events, 
while also looking at the effects of personality characteristics on these variables. These 
findings may have implications for eyewitness testimony, and could inform better 
interviewing strategies.  
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Appendix B. TIPI (Ten-Item Personality Inventory) 
  
TIPI (Ten-Item Personality Inventory) 
 
This scale is available at gosling.psy.utexas.edu and its author has authorized its use for 
any purpose.  
 
Instructions 
 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
the statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if 
one characteristic applies more strongly than the other. 
 
     1   2             3         4     5   6                 7  
Strongly         Disagree       Slightly    Neutral             Slightly                Agree           Strongly  
Disagree                                   Disagree                                     Agree           Agree 
 
1. ______ Extraverted, enthusiastic 
2. ______ Critical, quarrelsome 
3. ______ Dependable, self-disciplined 
4. ______ Anxious, easily upset 
5. ______ Open to new experiences, complex 
6. ______ Reserved, quiet 
7. ______ Sympathetic, warm 
8. ______ Disorganized, careless 
9. ______ Calm, emotionally stable 
10. ______ Conventional, uncreative  
 
 
 
(Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann Jr., 2003)  
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Appendix C. Almost Perfect Scale – Revised  
 
Almost Perfect Scale-Revised 
 
This scale is freely available at kennethwang.com/apsr.  
 
Instructions  
The following items are designed to measure attitudes people have toward themselves, 
their performance, and toward others. There are no right or wrong answers. Please 
respond to all of the items. Use your first impression and do not spend too much time on 
individual items in responding.  
Respond to each of the items using the scale below to describe your degree of agreement 
with each item. Fill in the appropriate number circle on the computer answer sheet that is 
provided. 
 
     1   2             3         4     5   6                 7  
Strongly         Disagree       Slightly    Neutral             Slightly                Agree           Strongly  
Disagree                                   Disagree                                     Agree           Agree 
       
1. I have high standards for my performance at work or at school. 
2. I am an orderly person.  
3. I often feel frustrated because I can’t meet my goals.  
4. Neatness is important to me.  
5. If you don’t expect much out of yourself, you will never succeed.  
6. My best just never seems to be good enough for me.  
7. I think things should be put away in their place  
8. I have high expectations for myself.  
9. I rarely live up to my high standards.  
10. I like to always be organized and disciplined.  
11. Doing my best never seems to be enough.  
12. I set very high standards for myself.  
13. I am never satisfied with my accomplishments.  
14. I expect the best from myself.  
15. I often worry about not measuring up to my own expectations.  
16. My performance rarely measures up to my standards.  
17. I am not satisfied even when I know I have done my best.  
18. I try to do my best at everything I do.  
19. I am seldom able to meet my own high standards of performance.  
20. I am hardly ever satisfied with my performance.  
21. I hardly ever feel that what I’ve done is good enough.  
22. I have a strong need to strive for excellence.  
23. I often feel disappointment after completing a task because I know I could have done 
better.  
 
(Slaney, Mobley, Trippi, Ashby, & Johnson, 1996) 
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Appendix D. Rumination Scale 
Rumination Scale 
 
A copy of this scale has been distributed by Dr Susan Nolen-Hoeksema and is available 
for download at yale.edu/snhlab.  
 
Instructions 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of 
the items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost 
always think or do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what 
you generally do, not what you think you should do.  
 
1 almost never  2 sometimes     3 often  4 almost always  
 
1. think about how alone you feel  
2. think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this”  
3. think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness  
4. think about how hard it is to concentrate  
5. think “What am I doing to deserve this?”  
6. think about how passive and unmotivated you feel.  
7. analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed  
8. think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore  
9. think “Why can’t I get going?”  
10. think “Why do I always react this way?”  
11. go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  
12. write down what you are thinking about and analyze it  
13. think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  
14. think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.”  
15. think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”  
16. think “Why can’t I handle things better?”  
17. think about how sad you feel.  
18. think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes  
19. think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything  
20. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed  
21.go someplace alone to think about your feelings  
22. think about how angry you are with yourself 
 
(Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) 
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Appendix E. BIS/BAS (Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Approach Systems) Scales 
 
BIS/BAS (Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Approach System) Scales 
The BIS/BAS Scales and scoring are available at psy.miami.edu/faculty/ccarver. 
Instructions 
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or 
disagree with.  For each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the 
item says.  Please respond to all the items; do not leave any blank.  Choose only one 
response to each statement.  Please be as accurate and honest as you can be.  Respond to 
each item as if it were the only item.  That is, don't worry about being "consistent" in 
your responses.  Choose from the following four response options: 
  1 = very true for me  
  2 = somewhat true for me  
  3 = somewhat false for me  
  4 = very false for me 
1.  A person's family is the most important thing in life.  
2.  Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or 
nervousness.  
3.  I go out of my way to get things I want.  
4.  When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it.  
5.  I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.  
6.  How I dress is important to me.  
7.  When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.  
8.  Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.  
9.  When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.  
10.  I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
11.  It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut.  
12.  If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away.  
13.  I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me.  
14.  When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.  
15.  I often act on the spur of the moment.  
16.  If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up."  
17.  I often wonder why people act the way they do.  
18.  When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.  
19.  I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important.  
20.  I crave excitement and new sensations. 
21.  When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.  
22.  I have very few fears compared to my friends.  
23.  It would excite me to win a contest.  
24.  I worry about making mistakes.  
(Carver and White, 1994) 
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Appendix F. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
 
PANAS 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  
 
Instructions 
 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the past few weeks. Use the 
following scale to record your answers:  
 
        1           2           3           4           5  
very slightly        a little         moderately        quite a bit        extremely  
or not at all 
 
______ Interested   ______ Irritable    
______ Distressed   ______ Alert 
______ Excited   ______ Ashamed  
______ Upset    ______ Inspired 
______ Strong   ______ Nervous   
______ Guilty    ______ Determined 
______ Scared    ______ Attentive 
______ Hostile       ______ Jittery  
______ Enthusiastic   ______ Active 
______ Proud    ______ Afraid 
 
 
 (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1988) 
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Appendix G. Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire  
 
Adapted version of the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ)  
 
Instructions 
  
Please use the following scale to answer questions about your memory.  
 
     1   2             3         4     5   6                 7  
Not at all                Vaguely            Distinctly             As clearly as it were 
                   happening right now 
 
1. As I remember the event, I feel as if I am reliving the original event.  
2. As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind. 
3. As I remember the event, I can see it in my mind.  
4. As I remember the event, I or other people are talking.  
5. As I remember the event, I know its spatial layout.  
6. As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then. 
7. As I remember the event, I can recall the setting where it occurred.  
 
Now, please use the following scale to answer questions about your memory. 
 
     1   2             3         4     5   6                 7  
Not at all                Vaguely            Distinctly             As much as any  
                        memory 
 
1. Sometimes people know something happened to them without being able to 
actually remember it. As I think about the event, I can actually remember it rather 
than just knowing that it happened. 
2. As I remember the event, it comes to me in words. 
3. As I remember the event, I feel that I can travel back in time when it happened, 
that I am a subject in it again, rather than an outside observer tied to the present. 
4. As I remember the event, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a coherent 
story or episode and not as an isolated fact, observation, or scene. 
5. This memory is significant for my life because it imparts an important message 
for me or represents an anchor, critical juncture, or turning point.  
6. Would you be confident enough in your memory to testify in a court of law. 
 
The remaining questions have unique scales. 
 
1. I believe the event in m memory really occurred in the way I remember it and that 
I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did not occur.  
Scale: 1=100% imaginary; 7=100% real) 
2. Since it happened, I have thought or talked about this event.  
Scale: 1=not at all; 7=as often as any event in my life 
	 83	 
3. If another witness to the event, who you generally trusted, existed and told you a 
very different account of the event to what extent could you be persuaded that 
your memory was wrong. 
Scale: 1=not at all; 3=in some details; 5=in some main points; 7=completely 
4. To the best of your knowledge, is the memory of an event that occurred once at 
one particular time and place, a summary or merging of many similar or related 
events, or for events that occurred over a fairly continuous extended period of 
time lasting more than a day?  
Scale: 1=once; 2=merging; 3=extended 
5. Please date the memory (day/month/year) as accurately as you can. Please fill in a 
month, day, and year even if you must estimate. If the memory extended over a 
period of time, report the approximate middle of the period.  
6. To what extent is your memory of the event distorted by your believes, motives, 
and expectations rather than an accurate reflection of the event as a neutral 
observer would report it?  
Scale: 1=100% distorted; 7=100% accurate 
 
(Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg, 2003) 
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Appendix H. Film Plot Questionnaire. 
 
Film Plot Questionnaire  
 
Instructions          ____ 
 
Approximately how many times have you seen this film?  ____  
 
Please use the following scale to answer questions about the film plot you have just 
described.  
 
     1   2             3         4     5   6                 7  
Not at all                Vaguely            Distinctly             As clearly as it were 
                   happening right now 
 
8. As I remember the film, I feel as if I am reliving the experience of watching it. ___ 
9. As I remember the film, I can hear it in my mind. ___ 
10. As I remember the film, I can see it in my mind. ___ 
11. As I remember the film, the characters are talking. ___ 
12. As I remember the film, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then. ___ 
 
Now, please use the following scale to answer questions about the film plot you have 
described. 
 
     1   2             3         4     5   6                 7  
Not at all                Vaguely            Distinctly             As much as any  
                       other film 
 
7. Sometimes people know they experienced something without being able to actually remember it. 
As I think about the film, I can actually remember it rather than just knowing I watched it. ___ 
8. As I remember the film, it comes to me in words. ___ 
9. As I remember the film, I feel that I can travel back in time when I watched it, that I am viewing it 
again, rather than being an outside observer tied to the present. ___ 
10. As I remember the film, it comes to me in words or in pictures as a coherent story or episode and 
not as an isolated fact, observation, or set of scenes. ___ 
11. This film is significant for my life because it imparts an important message for me. ___ 
 
The remaining questions have unique scales. 
 
7. I believe the film plot really unrolled the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or 
fabricated anything that did not occur. ___ 
Scale: 1=100% imaginary; 7=100% real) 
8. Since I watched it, I have thought or talked about this film. ___ 
Scale: 1=not at all; 7=as often as any event in my life 
9. If a person who watched this film, who you generally trusted, told you a very different account of 
the film plot, to what extent could you be persuaded that your memory was wrong. ___ 
Scale: 1=not at all; 3=in some details; 5=in some main points; 7=completely 
10. Please give the date (day/month/year) for when you last watched the film as accurately as you can. 
Please fill in a day, month, and year even if you must estimate. ________ 
11. To what extent is your account of the film plot distorted by your beliefs, motives, and expectations 
rather than an accurate reflection as a neutral observer would report it? ___ 
Scale: 1=100% distorted; 7=100% accurate 	
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Appendix I. Example of a pair of accounts of a sad autobiographical memory and the 
associated confidence judgement questionnaire that was sent to the participant. 
 
P030 Sad memory, Session 1 
So, one day, all of the family in the living room and the two babies crying and mama and 
dad, and stepdad stressed, and so stepdad asked my big brother to make juice and big 
brother said no and went upstairs, they asked me and then I begin to move and then 
stepdad explodes and start shouting and swearing and everything, and so yeah. That’s it. 
 
P030 Sad memory, Session 2 
Ok, so it’s dark outside, evening, all the family is sitting in the living room, two sofas and 
mom and dad sitting on one sofa, two young children crying, and um, my big brother 
Tom is there and I am there on the other sofa I think. And yeah they’re crying, and 
crying. The TV may be on, I can’t remember. Maybe, maybe not. Anyway, so mom asks 
Tom, the big brother, to make orange juice for the children and Tom kind of refuses and 
eventually leaves the room and walks up the stairs to his own bedroom. And so, I think 
mom asks me and then me, probably because Tom didn’t do it, I kind of say no as well. 
And then the stepdad, who’d been quiet up to this point, suddenly explodes in rage and 
he’s obviously very distressed, very stressed, the baby is crying, working hard, so he 
explodes, starts swearing, and he starts to approach me and I obviously back off and back 
off, and he approaches me and starts swearing. Man, make this juice, swearing and 
shouting, and I backed off all the way in to the kitchen and I’m crying and he’s swearing 
	 86	 
and then eventually he leaves the kitchen, goes up to my big brother’s room and I think 
that’s the memory. 
Do you want to say anything else? 
No. 
1. The family was in the living room.  
2. It was dark outside. 
3. Mom and dad were sitting on a sofa. 
4. The two young children were crying.  
5. My big brother Tom was there. 
6. I was on the other sofa. 
7. The TV was on. 
8. Mom asked Tom to make orange juice for the children. 
9. Tom refused. 
10. Tom leaved the room. 
11. Tom went to his bedroom. 
12. Mom asked me to make juice. 
13. I also said no. 
14. My stepdad was quiet to that point. 
15. He suddenly exploded. 
16. He started shouting. 
17. He stared swearing. 
18. I backed all the way in the kitchen. 
19. I was crying. 
20. He eventually left the kitchen.  
Old: none 
New: 2,3,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,18,19,20 
Both: 1,4,5,15,16,17 
Inconsistent: 8 (not mom, but dad) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
